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1.1  Introduction 
Only very recently has aging started to attract national attention. During the 
past two decades, however, Japan has been aging very rapidly. In fact, some 
people claim that no other country in history has aged more rapidly, although 
it is obviously very difficult to verify this assertion. Two factors that usually 
contribute to the process of aging-declining  mortality and declining fertil- 
ity-have  indeed been present in Japan. Of these two factors, the most domi- 
nant since the mid- 1960s has been the decline in mortality. Almost all newborn 
babies are now expected to reach age 65 (fig. l.l), and more than half of them 
are expected to reach age 80. This is the best mortality record in the world, 
and probably in the history of humankind. 
In  1960, there were only 501,000 men and women who were 65 years old. 
Thirty years later, in 1990, 1,193,000 Japanese were this age. The life expec- 
tancy at this particular age was 11.6 years for men and 14.1 years for women 
in 1960. In 1990, it was 16.2 years for men and 20.0 years for women (fig. 1.2). 
As the size of the population at age 65 doubled and the life expectancy in- 
creased by 50 percent, we would expect the size of the elderly population to have 
at least tripled over these 30 years. This is, in fact, what happened in Japan. 
This alone is a very dramatic change, but it is only part of the story. Close 
to 2 million baby boomers born during the years immediately after World War 
I1  will reach age 65 in the second decade of  the twenty-first century. At that 
time, the number of elderly will be at least twice that in 1990 if life expectancy 
remains the same. 
Moreover, in the past  10 years the decline in the birthrate  has started to 
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Fig. 1.1  Probability of survival to ages 65 and 80 (newborn babies) 
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Fig. 1.2  Life expectancy at age 65 
accelerate Japan’s  population aging process. In  1960, 1,606,000 babies  were 
born in Japan. In  1990, 1,221,000 babies were born, a decline of  almost 25 
percent. The total fertility rate (TFR) of Japanese women was 2.0 in 1960 but 
only 1.54 in 1990. If this low fertility rate persists, and we believe that it will, in 
the first quarter of the next century only three-quarters of the present working 13  Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs 
population will  be  supporting almost twice the present  elderly  population. 
Thus, the ratio of the elderly to the working population will be about 8/3, or 
more than 2.5 times, the present ratio. 
Judging from the current population structure, by  the first quarter of  the 
twenty-first century, the rapid population aging process will be over in Japan, 
but it will be followed by  a slow, steady aging process  as long as the low 
fertility rate persists. In May 1991, at JCER, we published our own population 
projection for the next 30 years (Ogura 1991). We followed it with a series of 
demographic studies (e.g., Ogura 1992; Ogura and Dekle 1992). All available 
evidence so far indicates that the birthrate is very unlikely to rebound in the 
next few years, as is expected in the government’s 1992 official population 
forecast. Not only is the low fertility rate here to stay, but a further decline in 
TFR is very likely to occur in the next few years. In fact, the government re- 
cently announced that TFR dropped to 1.47 in 1993, but it has not abandoned 
its optimistic projection.  It is almost certain that new public policies will be 
introduced to help raise the fertility rate, but it is not clear how effective these 
interventions will be in this delicate area unless we are willing to abandon the 
present family structure in Japan. 
We must, therefore, take the expected increase in the elderly population rela- 
tive to the working population up to, say, the year 2020 as a given. It is either 
too late or too expensive to try to change that substantially. In contrast, in spite 
of our projections here, changes in public policies and social institutions could 
have substantial effects on the population structure in the second quarter of the 
twenty-first century. 
Although aging is expected to have far-reaching effects on all aspects of our 
lives, many  public  systems have not  had  time to adjust  to these expected 
changes, particularly  since the government is not yet fully convinced of  the 
need to adjust. In terms of the effects on the national economy, the most serious 
effects will be those on health care costs and public pension costs. Both will 
almost directly reflect the expected increase in the elderly population, and we 
should carefully examine whether present financing mechanisms will be able 
to withstand the crunch. 
In this paper, we estimate the costs of public pension benefits, and the insur- 
ance tax rates needed to support them, using the Social Insurance Model devel- 
oped by this author and others. The results of our analyses clearly illustrate the 
instability of the Japanese public pension systems. The insurance tax rates of 
pension programs for employees will climb in an almost straight-line fashion, 
from less than 15 percent today to 40 percent in the second quarter of the next 
century. This paper investigates three alternative measures that can control the 
cost of future benefits: (1) delay of the start of old-age pensions, (2) disposable 
income slide or benefit taxation, and (3) price indexation. Measure 1 will re- 
duce the required tax rate by  only 5 percent,  while measures 2 and 3 will 
reduce it by 10 percent each. Various combinations of these measures will have 
greater effects than  any one measure alone, but much  less effect than  the 
simple sum of these measures. 14  Seiritsu Ogura 
In the next section, we outline our public pension simulation model and its 
key variables, providing necessary accounts of Japanese public pension  sys- 
tems. We then present the simulation results, showing what will happen if we 
maintain the present public pension structure as the baseline scenario. Finally, 
we discuss the effects of the three possible reforms, which could be introduced 
separately or in various combinations, on the total cost of public pensions. 
1.2  Outline of the Simulation Model 
Our simulation model consists of the Population Model and the Social Insur- 
ance Model, which in turn consists of the Public Health Insurance Sub-Model 
and the Public Pension Sub-Model. 
1.2.  I  Population Model 
Assumption on mortality. The Population Model was run for every year from 
1990 to 2050; the rest of the model was run for every five-year period. The 
initial values for population  regarding age and sex were set at  1990 census 
values, and the numbers of  deaths by age and sex were estimated using the 
mortality data in the 1990 life table. Contrary to the government’s projection 
of a continued decline in mortality, we assumed that long-run mortality rates 
will remain as they are. In the past few years, for several major diseases such 
as cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and cardiovascular disease, the mortality 
rates of the most elderly group have either stopped declining or started to rise 
more sharply, suggesting the possibility of an upturn in the long run. 
Assumption on fertility. Our Population Model includes an innovative method 
of estimating the number of new births. In the past, government estimates were 
based on the projection of the number of married women and their fertility rate 
at each age. This simple method could be easily manipulated by the fertility 
rate projection, as is evident in the government’s notorious 1986  official projec- 
tion. In this regard, Ogura (1991) presented the empirical fact that the fertility 
of a married woman of a given age is determined more by the number of years 
since her marriage than by her biological age itself, and they proposed to use 
this fact as the basis for fertility rate projections. For instance, two 30-year-old 
married women can have completely different likelihoods of giving birth in the 
course of a year if one has been married for 10 years and the other for 1 year. 
The odds of the former giving birth are slightly better than 50 to 1 (2 percent), 
while those of  the latter are better than 2 to  1 (54 percent). Averaging these 
two probabilities involves a considerable risk in population projection if there 
is no guarantee that the “vintage” mix will remain reasonable constant over time. 
The methodology we adopted was very simple. If we denote the number of 
women of age n who have been married z years in year t as k(n,  z;  t)  and the proba- 
bility of a woman giving birth to her first child as .rr,(n,  z),  the number of first 
children born out of this group is given by 
c,(n,  z; t)  = .rr,(n,  z)k(n,  z;  t). 15  Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs 
As an example, figure 1.3 shows the probability r,  for women aged 18-41 
who have been married one to five years. In the projection, z runs up to 9 years 
for first children and  12 years for other children. Probabilities were obtained 
as averages of the ratio c,(n,  z;  t)/k(n,  z;  t),  where values oft  were chosen to be 
1980, 1985, and 1989. We should note that the data for c,(n,  z;  t)  and k(n, z; t) 
were obtained directly from Eta1 Statistics (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
various years), which excludes the case of couples whose cohabitation started 
prior to the calendar year when they reported their marriage. This group ac- 
counts for about  10 percent of  all marriages reported, but in the absence of 
detailed information on the childbearing behavior of these couples, we com- 
puted the n,(n,  z)  ratios without data for them. We  believe that this will not 
affect the results of our fertility projection too much, but it is possible that the 
probability shown in figure 1.3  may have a small bias. 
Summing c,(n,  z;  t)  over z,  we obtained the total number of first children for 
women of age n,  or 
c,(n;  t)  = Cc,(n,  z; t). 
We then summed c,(n;  t) over n and obtained the total number of first children 
born to women of all ages, or C,(t): 
C,(t)  = Cc,(n;  t), 
out of which 50.37 percent were assumed to be boys and the rest girls. In our 
model, we repeated the same procedure two more times-once  for second 
children and again for third or more children. 
Assumption on marriage rates. The number of women getting married at age 
n was assumed to be a fixed proportion (K(n)  of the female population of  that 
age, orf(n; t);  hence, 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25  26 27 28 29 30 31  32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 A0 41 
Age of  Women 
Fig. 1.3  Probability of giving birth to a first child 16  Seiritsu Ogura 
k(n,  0;  t)  = K(n)  f(n;  t). 
For ~(n),  or the rate of marriage at age n, we took the number of women mar- 
ried in 1989 whose cohabitation and marriage coincided in the same calendar 
year and divided it by the female population of age n in 1989. In year t + 1, 
all married women who survive increase by one year in both age (n)  and years 
married (z),  or 
k(n + 1, z  + 1; t  +1) = s,(n)k(n,  z;  t), 
where sf(n) is one minus the mortality rate at age n.  The marriage rate as com- 
puted from 1989 data includes both first marriages and second or third mar- 
riages. In view of the increasing share of second marriages, it may be worth- 
while to model divorce behavior in future population projections. One valid 
criticism of this procedure is that the marriage rate should be replaced by the 
marriage probability conditional on being single. More specifically, according 
to this view the number of women getting married in their thirties (numerator) 
is small simply because the number of single women in their thirties (denomi- 
nator) is small, but as the size of  this latter group increases, the size of  the 
former should increase as well. Thus, by directly linking marriage to popula- 
tion, our projection may  have a downward bias, particularly for women  in 
their thirties. 
Results of population projection. At the start of industrialization, in 1872, the 
Japanese population was estimated to be around 34.8 million, and it has contin- 
ued to increase during each of  the past  120 years, with 1944 being the only 
exception. According to the projection of our model, however, this phase will 
be over in 10 years. 
Births will increase in the next 10 years, reflecting childbirths to the second 
baby boomers, but this third baby boom will be a very modest one, peaking at 
less than 1.4 million, compared with 2 million births for their parents’ genera- 
tion. Following the third baby boom, the number of  births will continue to 
decline for the first quarter of  the twenty-first century, which will be inter- 
rupted only briefly by the fourth baby boom around the year 2030. The fourth 
baby boom will be very feeble, producing slightly over 900,000 babies, and 
the number of births will start to fall quickly; by the middle of the twenty-first 
century it will be about half of the current number. 
In contrast, the number of  deaths will continue to increase monotonically 
until it reaches 1.8 million in 2025, and it is expected to remain at that level 
for almost a decade and a half. As a result of  these two divergent trends in 
births and deaths, the total Japanese population will reach its peak in 2005 and 
will decline at an accelerating rate thereafter. The rate of decrease will stabilize 
in the second quarter of the twenty-first century, but in 2025 the number of 
deaths will be almost twice the number of births, reducing the population by 
almost 900,000 people a year. 17  Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs 
Age composition of  population. Table 1.1 shows the composition of the Japa- 
nese population in different age groups. In this table, people in their sixties 
and eighties are grouped in five-year age groups, while the rest are shown in 
ten-year groups. From this table, we can see that in 1990 about 11.5 percent of 
the population was 65 years of age or older, but according to our projection the 
proportion  will more than double by  2020. By 2040, the proportion will be 
close to 30 percent. 
1.2.2  Social Insurance Model 
Our Social Insurance Model inherited  its basic structure from the Public 
Health Insurance Model of Ogura and Irifune (1990) and includes the Public 
Pension  Model  that  originated  in  Ogura  and  Nishimoto  (1984). We  have 
adopted this strategy primarily because, in Japan, public health insurance pro- 
grams collectively  have the most extensive coverage of  all social insurance 
schemes. For instance, as of the end of March 1990, a simple sum of all indi- 
viduals  covered by  any public health insurance program  was  123,600,000, 
which  was  slightly greater than the entire population  of Japan at the time. 
Moreover, availability of  information on the economic, social, and other char- 
acteristics of participants in major public health insurance programs is far bet- 
ter than that for public pension programs. Finally, similarities exist between 
public health insurance programs and public pension programs, as shown in 
table 1.2. 
Roughly speaking, the workers covered by  Health Insurance Managed by 
Associations (HIMA) are employees of corporations large enough to form in- 
dependent health insurance groups (interpreted as corporations with more than 
700 employees), while those covered by Health Insurance Managed by Gov- 
ernment (HIMG) are employees of the rest of the corporations. With respect to 
public pensions, both groups are covered by the Welfare Annuity Plan (WAP). 
Table 1.1  Prgiection of Ape Composition of the Japanese Population (percent) 
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Total 
18.3  16.3  15.8  11.7  9.4  9.7 
21.8  16.3  14.7  15.4  11.4  9.4 
17.7  19.0  14.4  13.5  15.0  11.3 
14.5  16.0  17.1  14.1  13.2  15.0 
10.5  12.7  14.1  15.7  13.7  13.0 
8.4  8.9  11.0  12.7  14.9  13.3 
3.1  3.6  3.8  5.4  6.0  7.4 
2.3  2.9  3.4  4.0  5.5  6.4 
2.7  3.3  4.3  5.4  7.6  9.5 
0.5  0.6  0.9  1.4  1.9  2.9 
0.2  0.3  0.5  0.7  1.5  1.9 













7.5  7.9  7.1 
8.6  8.3  8.9 
11.0  9.4  9.2 
10.7  12.1  10.5 
12.7  11.6  13.4 
16.3  13.6  12.6 
7.2  8.1  6.8 
6.2  8.6  7.3 
11.4  12.2  15.3 
4.8  4.0  5.0 
3.6  4.3  3.9 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources; Ogura (1991) and author’s computations. 18  Seiritsu Ogura 
Table 1.2  Coverage of Public Health and Public Pension Plans (thousand 
individuals) 
Public Health Insurance Programs  Public Pension Programs 
Health Insurance Managed by  Welfare Annuity Plan 
Total  3 1,509  29,921 
Associations (large firms)  14,173 
Government (small firms)  17,336 
Mutual Aid Associations 
Health Insurance for  Pension Plan 
Mutual Aid Associations 
National Government  1,707  1,656 
Local Governments  2,957  3,277 
Private Schools  393  384 
All NHI Programs  43,789  17,799 
National Health Insurance  National Pension Plan 
Sources: Social Insurance Agency (1  992) and author’s computations. 
Mutual Aid Associations (MAA) provide health insurance and pension insur- 
ance for workers in national government, local governments, and other public 
corporations.  Municipal  governments  provide  National  Health  Insurance 
(NHI) plans  for self-employed  residents  and  employees  of  unincorporated 
businesses, who are obligated to join the National Pension Plan (NPP). 
Our model starts with the current allocation of participants in public health 
insurance programs and adjusts this number to obtain the allocation of partici- 
pants in public pension programs. By comparing these two numbers, it is clear 
that only small adjustments are required as far as the WAP is concerned. The 
problem is the NPP, which is plagued by a high noncompliance ratio. 
Allocation of  labor force  entrants. In the framework of  our model, workers 
enter the labor market for the first time in the two five-year age groups 15-19 
and 20-24.  They are absorbed into one of three sectors, each of which repre- 
sents a public health insurance plan, according to the rules in table 1.3. 
The remainder of the cohort will either become self-employed, to be covered 
by  the NHI/NPP, or be dependent family members of  employed workers in- 
sured by the HIMA, HIMG, or MAA. To  arrive at the number of those to be 
insured by the NHVNPP, it is necessary to estimate the number of  dependent 
family members of workers covered by the HIMA, HIMG, or MAA; then 
NHI coverage = Cohort population 
-  (HIMA workers + HIMG workers 
+ MAA workers) 
-  (HIMA dependents + HIMG dependents 
+ MAA dependents). 
Allocation of  dependents of  employed workers. Ogura and Irifune (1990) esti- 
mated the number of family dependents of  employed workers from the cross- 19  Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs 
Table 1.3  Allocation of Labor Force Entrants 
Age Group  Sex  HIMA (%)  HIMG (%)  MAA 
15-19  Male  4  5  59,000 
Female  6  6  3,000 
20-24  Male  23  22  317,000 
Female  31  23  180,000 
Source: Author’s computations based on Ministry of Health and Welfare (1993) 
tabulation  of numbers and ages of  dependents and workers using the latest 
available HIMA and HIMG data. These cross-tabulations are available for each 
of the four possible combinations of sexes for worker and dependent. For in- 
stance, in the given data, if we denote the number of female dependents in the 
kth  age group supported by the sth age group as  f,(k,  s) and the number of 
male workers in the sth age group as M(s;  0),  the probability that a male worker 
in the sth age group supports a female family member in the kth  age group, 
denoted as kf,,,(k,  s),  is computed as follows: 
Repeating the process for all possible s  and k, we can obtain the support proba- 
bility matrix [kf,,,(k,  s)].  We can then postmultiply this matrix by the age-group 
column vector of the number of male workers at time t,  or [M(s;  t)],  and obtain 
the age-group column vector of the number of  female dependents supported 
by male workers in this system, or [Ff,,,(k;  t)].  We can repeat this procedure for 
female-female, male-male, and male-female combinations to obtain [Fff(k;  t)], 
[M,,,,(k;  t)],  and [Mmf(k;  t)].  Female dependent vectors can then be added to 
yield the total number of family dependents in this system. This was the proce- 
dure adopted by Ogura and Irifune (1  990). 
The problem with this procedure is that the number of family dependents at 
a given time reflects family formation behavior such as marriage and fertility 
during the preceding years. Thus, in view of the fundamental changes that have 
been taking place in Japanese family structure, if we apply this method directly 
we will end up substantially overestimating the number of dependents of em- 
ployed workers and hence substantially underestimating the population in the 
self-employed sector. 
To avoid this problem, in this model we computed the share of dependents 
for each male and female worker; for instance, instead of computing [f,(k,  s)/ 
M(s;  O)],  we computed  [cf,(k,  s)/F(k;  O))/M(s;  O)].  where F(k) is the female 
population of the kth age group. Postmultiplying this share matrix by the age- 
group vector of the number of male workers, or [M(s;  t)],  we obtained the age- 
group vector of the proportion of the female population that will be supported 
by employed male workers in this system, or [Ofm(k;  t)]. Multiplying each com- 
ponent of this vector by the female population in the appropriate age group, or 
F(k;  t),  we obtained the new number of female dependents supported by male 20  Seiritsu Ogura 
workers  covered  by  each  plan.  This procedure  takes  care of  the  effect  of 
changes in fertility, but not of  the effect of changes in marital behavior. We 
have yet to adjust for the latter in the current version of our model. 
Net quit rates. The labor force entrants absorbed in each system will move across 
the systems over time. The quality of available data on intersystem mobility is 
not sufficiently high to enable us to model such behavior, and in the past we 
used crude “net quit rates” (Ogura 1989; Ogura and Irifune 1990). The net quit 
rate of male workers in a system is simply the expected number of male work- 
ers of the (k + 1)-th age group in the next period per one male worker of the 
kth age group in the system. As such, the rate reflects both entry and exit behav- 
iors of workers in the system in different age groups. We constructed these 
rates for male workers in both  the WAP and the MAA, using the combined 
data of the  HIMG and the HIMA during the  1980s, and assumed that they 
remain constant during the entire period of our simulation exercise. 
As for female workers, in view of the upward trend in their labor force par- 
ticipation rates, we decided to incorporate the expected changes in their net 
quit rates. Currently, the labor force participation  rates of Japanese  women 
follow an M shape, with ages 20-24  as the first peak (about 75 percent) and 
ages 40-44  and 45-49  forming the second peak (about 70 percent). At present, 
the valley is located at  ages 30-34,  but it has been  getting shallower every 
year. Most long-term economic forecasts predict that early in the twenty-first 
century the valley between the two peaks will virtually disappear, as it has in 
most Western industrialized countries. We adjusted our net quit rates in such a 
way that, by the year 2010, the labor force participation rate will assume a flat 
pattern at around 70 percent, as is the case in the United States. 
1.2.3  Welfare Annuity Plan Sub-Model 
Estimation of  the average cost of  benejits We  estimated the average cost of 
benefits separately for retired male and female workers in each cohort, as they 
become eligible for WAP benefits. 
Special  bene$ts  before age 65. For male employed workers covered  by  the 
WAP, we incorporated the four following full components (the parameters in 
boldface are those directly determined  by laws or regulations,  and those in 
italics are our estimates using WAP data up to 1990): 
Special benefit = Fixed benefit  + Proportional benefit 
+ Spouse benefit + Special benefit, 
where 
Fixed benefit = 1,388 X Adjustment rate (t) 
X Average months credited (t), 21  Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs 
Proportional benefit = Coefficient (t) 
X Average monthly earnings  X Average 
months credited (t), 
n 
Spouse benefit = 209,100 X 
ratio (n,  t), 
Special spouse benefit = Special benefits constant (t) 
X 
Dependent spouse 
Dependent spouse ratio) (n, t). 
n 
For female employed workers covered by the WAP, however, only the first two 
components were incorporated in  the computation. Those receiving partial 
benefits due to continued employment at ages 60-64  were assumed to receive 
80 percent of full benefits. 
WAP benejits. With respect to male retired workers over age 65, the average 
cost of a benefit was computed 
WAP cost = Husband’s basic pension + Wife’s basic pension 
+ WAP benefit. 
where 
Husband’s basic pension = 725,300 X  Credited month ratio (t), 
Wife’s basic pension = 725,300 X  Credit month ratio (t) 
X 2 Dependent spouse ratio (n, t) 
+ Transfer benefit (t), 
Number of creditable months (t), 
for wife less than 65 years old + Special 
spouse benefit for wife less than 65 
years old. 
n 
Credit month ratio = Average months credited (t)  I 
WAP benefit = Proportional benefit + Spouse benefit 
Survivor benejit 
Male receiving survivor benefit = 13,000 X  12, 
Female reveiving survivor benefit = 75,000 X  12. 
Intersystem benejit 
Intersystem benefit = 0.2 X WAP benefit. 
Credited months. On the basis of the 1981 and 1986 data on the distribution of 
workers according to the number of credited months in each age group, pub- 22  Seiritsu Ogura 
lished in the OfJicial Projection of  Public Pension Costs (Ministry of Health 
1990), we computed the increment in the number of credited months during 
those 60 months for each sex and age group. Taking the  1986 data as 1990 
values,  we  used  this  sex  and age-group  profile  of  increments  of  credited 
months to obtain the 1995 average number of credited months for workers in 
each sex and age group. 
Numbers of  recipients. Eighty-five percent of workers who were covered by 
HIMA and HIMG at age 55 and  who reach  age 60 are assumed to qualify 
for WAP special benefits  by  accumulating  more than  300 credited  months. 
Subsequently, another 10  percent of these workers are assumed to qualify for 
WAP basic pension benefits at age 65, through additional employment between 
ages 60 and 65. One-sixth of those who receive WAP special benefits receive 
reduced benefits because of continued employment, while the rest receive full 
benefits. In addition, the number of workers who will not be able to accumulate 
the necessary 300 credited months within the WAP itself but who have more 
than 300 credited months scattered among the WAP, MAA, and NPP and qual- 
ify for the intersystem benefit is assumed to be equal to 20 percent of  those 
who receive WAP special benefits. 
Average monthly earnings. The computation of lifetime average monthly earn- 
ings is based on the estimated 1990 average monthly earnings of WAP workers 
for each sex and age group, which is obtained as the weighted average monthly 
earnings for each sex and age group of HIMG and HIMA, with the weights 
being the estimated numbers of insured workers in the two systems. Assuming 
that this sex and age-group profile of monthly earnings has persisted and will 
continue to persist indefinitely, for our baseline case in which we assume sta- 
tionary wage levels we computed simple arithmetic averages of monthly earn- 
ings during continuous periods of time ending at age 59, equal to the credited 
months in length. The only factor that can change lifetime average monthly 
earnings is the number of credited months, but according to our assumptions, 
this figure becomes  stationary very quickly after increasing for the first few 
periods. Thus, in our baseline case, lifetime average monthly earnings are very 
close to constant. 
1.2.4  Mutual Aid Association Sub-Model 
MAA plans are a collection of plans for employees of the national govern- 
ment, local governments, Japan Railways System, Nippon Telephone and Tele- 
graph, private schools, and so forth, covering 5.5 million workers and their 7.5 
million family members. In spite of this significant size, little attempt has been 
made to analyze this sector as a social insurance group, mainly because the 
plans are so fragmented  and no single ministry has been able to collect the 
data necessary for analysis. Recently, the Statistical Yearbook of  Social Secu- 23  Projection of Japanese Public Pension Costs 
rity began publishing data on the cost of benefits, but information on the work- 
ers still remains very scarce compared with information on those in the WAP. 
As a social insurance group for employed workers, the MAA is currently 
facing the most serious aging problems,  with the cost of benefits outpacing 
revenues. It is clear that many plans in the MAA will not be able to remain 
independent much longer, but the conditions under which they, or the MAA in 
general, will be accepted by the WAP remain to be worked out. 
Number of  workers in the MAA.  Using the Labor Force Survey, we obtained 
the number of workers in the MAA for each sex and age group in 1990, then 
adjusted the figure by a common factor so that the sum of all workers would 
be equal to the number of insured MAA workers given by the Statistical Year- 
book of  Social Security (Office of the Prime Minister, 1990). We then estimated 
the number of dependent family members in each sex and age group using the 
same procedure as for the WAP (using the support share matrix of HIMA and 
the age-group vectors obtained above). 
Average monthly earnings. Since the MAA does not publish data on the aver- 
age monthly earnings of its workers in each sex and age group, we used HIMA 
data and adjusted them by a common factor so that the total size of the MARS 
tax  base  (sum of  the products of  average monthly  earnings and number of 
workers) coincides with the figure in the Statistical Yearbook. 
1.2.5  National Pension Plan Sub-Model 
Coverage of  the NPF! Legally speaking, every Japanese adult under age 60 is 
required to join the NPP unless he or she is covered by the WAP or MAA as 
an insured worker or a dependent spouse. NPP coverage is almost identical to 
that of NHI programs as a whole, except that adult nonspouse dependent fam- 
ily members of employed WAP/MAA workers are required to join the NPP 
on their own. In  spite of this mandatory participation,  NPP coverage is not 
automatically initiated when a person reaches age 20; he or she must go to the 
local social insurance office in person to get a special passbook. Then the per- 
son will have to keep on paying NPP monthly taxes for the next 40 years, 
which will be verified by the stamps in the passbook. 
From a practical point of view, unlike  the Social Security system in the 
United States, NPP coverage is not a prerequisite for either employment or tax 
payment in Japan. This has made the NPP almost a voluntary passbook savings 
account system. Recently, however, as the NPP tax has continued to rise, the 
government is finding it increasingly difficult to “compete” with private annu- 
ity insurance in rate of return. So far, this lack of mandatory coverage has not 
affected NPP coverage too much. But it is almost certain that the NPP tax will 
very soon reach its limit, beyond which nonpayment will dramatically increase. 
Compared with the population covered by the NHI programs, the number of 24  Seiritsu Ogura 
people covered by  the NPP is about 75 percent of those in their twenties, about 
50 percent of those aged 30-34,  and over 90 percent of those aged 35 and up. 
Number  of  credited  months. Starting from the average number of  credited 
months for each sex and age group contained in the 1990 official government 
forecast, we added the proportion of a period (namely, 60 months) that corre- 
sponds to the average NPP coverage ratio of the age group for each sex. 
Average  old-age pension benefit. The full old-age pension benefit for those 
who joined  the  NPP for  the maximum possible months before age 60  is 
725,000 yen per year. This is prorated according to the ratio of credited months 
to maximum possible months (480 months, except for those born before 1941). 
Number of pension benejiciaries. We  have  assumed that 75 percent of those 
covered by the NHI in the 55-59  age group will become vested for an old-age 
pension benefit by accumulating at least 300 credited months before they reach 
age 60. This ratio is based on records for the past few years. Of  those who 
become vested, we have again assumed that 11 percent of men and 18 percent 
of women will elect to receive reduced (50 percent) pension benefits when they 
reach age 60 but that the rest will wait until age 65 for full pension benefits. 
Cost of other benejk Since the disability benefit of the NPP is far more gener- 
ous than the old-age benefit, its share of the total cost of the NPP exceeds that 
of the WAP disability benefit by a wide margin. We have not yet modeled the 
following benefits individually: partial credit benefits, survivor benefits, and 
disability benefits. We have added 40 percent of the cost of old-age benefits to 
account for the costs of these benefits. 
1.3  Simulation Results of the Public Pension Model 
1.3.1  Framework of Simulation 
As our baseline case, we fixed the system parameters in the benefit equations 
and the wage structures at 1990 levels, as in our Social Insurance Model, and 
measured the effects of changes in population structure as well as in cohort- 
specific parameters in the benefit equations. Literally interpreted, this case re- 
flects no growth in real wages in the next half-century. More realistically, how- 
ever, it should be interpreted as a case in which all system parameters in the 
benefit equations are fully indexed to keep pace with changes in real wages. 
The advantage of our method is that by measuring everything in terms of units 
of labor, it is far easier for us to comprehend intuitively the sizes of benefits 
and burdens in the distant future and compare them with the present. 
With respect to wage indexation, the present Japanese public pension laws 
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changes in market wage rates. We should note that the laws have left room for 
the  government  to decide how  closely  past  earnings  should  be  indexed  to 
changes in real wages. The government quietly took advantage of this loophole 
in the last evaluation (1989) and limited the long-run indexation of real wage 
rates to about 70 percent without any explanation. 
1.3.2  Numbers of Recipients 
By adding together the numbers of  recipients of  all the benefits, one may 
not obtain a good quantity  index to indicate the  cost of  the public  pension 
systems. In  1990, for the WAP, old-age benefits accounted for 50 percent of 
recipients but 70 percent of the cost. In contrast, survivor benefits accounted 
for 20 percent  of the number of recipients  but only  14 percent  of the cost 
because the average cost of survivor benefits is only half that of old-age bene- 
fits. For this reason, in figure 1.4, we show only the numbers of old-age bene- 
fits recipients in the three systems through the first half  of  the next century 
(with the present system parameters). In 1990, there were 3.94 million recipi- 
ents in the WAP; this number will increase to 7.59 million by 2000 and 14.39 
million by 2020. There were 1.7  1 million recipients in the MAA. 
1.3.3  Total Cost of Benefits 
Figure  1.5 shows the total cost of benefits (in 10 billion yen) for the three 
systems in our baseline simulation case. According to our model, the total cost 
of WAP benefits, which stood at 9.2 trillion yen in 1990, will surpass 16 trillion 
yen in 2000, reach almost 23 trillion yen in 2010, and almost 28 trillion yen 
in 2020. 
The total cost of the MAA, which  stood at 5.6 trillion  yen  in  1990, will 
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increase only moderately to 6.2 trillion yen in 2000, after which it will begin a 
slow decline. The combined costs of benefits for these two employee pension 
plans will increase at a rate of 3 trillion yen every five years, from 14.8 trillion 
yen in 1990 to 36 trillion yen in 2030, or 2.5 times the 1990 level. 
As for the NPP, the cost of benefits, which stood at 4.3 trillion yen in 1990, 
will reach 5.6 trillion yen in 2000, 7 trillion yen in 2010, and 8.5 trillion yen 
in 2020, which will be the peak. The cost will remain around 8 trillion yen for 
some time afterward. Although the number of NPP recipients will increase by 
only 50 percent, costs will increase by  100 percent as a result of an increase in 
credited months. 
To summarize, given the present parameters of our public pension systems, 
the total cost of public pensions was  19 trillion yen  in  1990; this cost will 
increase to 28 trillion yen in 2000, 36 trillion yen in 2010, and 42 trillion yen 
in 2020, after which the rate of increase will become less sharp. 
1.3.4 
Figure 1.6 shows how much of the total cost of public pensions is accounted 
for by the cost of basic pension benefits. The basic pension includes not only 
the basic pension costs themselves but also what are usually referred to as their 
“equivalents” in the WAP and MAA for the claims already existing when the 
basic  pension  was  introduced.  Currently,  the  basic  pension  accounts  for 
slightly more than one-third of the total cost, but in 2015 it will account for 
almost one-half of the total. This implies that it will become much more diffi- 
cult to reduce the cost of benefits in the next century. 
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1.3.5  Cost of Benefits Borne by Each System 
Under the current Japanese public pension arrangement, each system does 
not automatically bear the full cost of  its benefits, to be paid by  either its 
own insurance taxes or income earned from accumulated funds, if any. Adjust- 
ments must be made for both the national government subsidy and the cross- 
subsidization involved in the Basic Pension Program. The national government 
subsidy is, however, tied to the Basic Pension Program, so we discuss only the 
structure of the Basic Pension Program here. 
Under the program, the government first adds up the costs of the basic pen- 
sion benefits for all three major systems. The total cost is then prorated to each 
system according to the number of insured individuals in the system (instead 
of the number of recipients) to amve at the cost of the Basic Pension Program 
assessed to each system. For the WAP and the MAA, the number of insured 
individuals includes not only the workers themselves but also their dependent 
spouses. Thus, for each system, 
Basic pension cost assessed = National cost of basic pension benefits 
X Share of insured individuals 
in the basic pension system. 
The national government subsidizes one-third of this assessed cost for each 
system, and each system bears two-thirds of this assessed value as far as basic 
pension benefits are concerned. Therefore, the cost actually borne by each sys- 
tem is given by 
Cost actually borne = Cost of benefits other than basic pension 
+ (2/3)  * Basic pension cost assessed. 28  Seiritsu Ogura 
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1.3.6  Tax Bases 
For the WAP and MAA, we can approximate the tax rates required to keep 
the systems solvent as a ratio of  the costs actually borne to the size of  the 
tax base. For these two systems, the tax base is essentially the annual payroll 
(excluding semiannual bonuses), which is primarily determined by the number 
of employed workers. For the NPP, which collects what is essentially a poll 
tax, the number of  insured individuals is its tax base. Figure  1.7 shows the 
changes in the number of  insured workers over time in each system as pre- 
dicted by our model. Although our model is based on a set of  very rigid and 
mechanical assumptions, it is nevertheless quite clear that, sooner or later, each 
system must face a declining number of insured workers. 
Both the MAA and the NPP are already facing a long, slow decline in work- 
ers toward 2020, at which time they will begin to experience a rapid decrease. 
For the MAA, the number of workers will decline slowly from 5 million in 
1990 to 4 million in 2020. As for the NPP, the number of insured individuals 
will decline from 15 million in 1990 to 13 million in 2020, after which the rate 
of decrease will accelerate. 
In our scenario, the only short-run exception is the WAP, which will show a 
net increase of more than 2 million insured workers between 1990 and 2000. 
This will be brought about by a combination of two factors: the participation 
of  the second baby boom generation in the labor market and the continued 
increase in female labor force participation. After the year 2000, the number 
of male workers in the WAP is expected to decline sharply, but the decline in 
the number of female workers will be more gradual. As a result, in 2020, com- 
pared to 1990, there will be 2 million fewer male workers but about the same 
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number of female workers. In the following 20 years, the number of both male 
and female workers will decline by more than 20 percent. 
In addition to the number of employed workers, the size of the WAP and the 
MAA annual payrolls will be affected by their sedage mixes. Figure 1.8 shows 
the changes in their tax bases, assuming that the sex/age profile of  wages of 
WAP  workers remains constant. The two curves decline rather sharply, re- 
flecting decreasing employment. At the same time, however, figure 1.8 shows 
that we can maintain the current size of our tax bases if we secure a 1 percent 
annual increase in real wages in the next half-century. 
1.3.7  Required Tax Rates 
The required tax rates are computed by  dividing the costs borne by the tax 
base for the WAP and the MAA separately and for them as a single system. In 
reality, the WAP in particular still holds a very substantial fund at this point, 
and this fund, as well as its interest income, could be used to pay for part of  its 
costs. Therefore, calling the ratio a “required tax rate” may be inappropriate. 
Although this is a valid criticism, it is clear that this ratio gives the upper bound 
of taxes required to keep the systems solvent. Moreover, we feel strongly that 
the significance of the system’s fund is blown out of proportion for the follow- 
ing two reasons. 
First, although the nominal interest income seems to be very large, most of 
it is depreciation of capital due to inflation, and the real interest income is a 
small portion of it. In fact, at present, the real rate of interest is only about 1 
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amounts to around  130 trillion yen, or about six years’ cost of all benefits at 
the current rate. A real interest rate of 1 percent a year will pay only 1.5 months 
of benefits on a permanent basis, even if the cost of benefits remains the same. 
Second, in a public pension system that promises wage indexation of benefits, 
the whole real  interest income cannot be used to pay  for the benefits  on a 
permanent basis; the relevant interest rate must be the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the rate of increase in nominal wages, or the differ- 
ence between the real interest rate and the rate of increase in real wages. Past 
experience suggests that this is very close to zero in Japan. 
As figure 1.9 shows, we should expect the required tax rate of the WAP to 
keep increasing by almost 5 percent every five years, from 11 percent in 1990 
to  17 percent in 2000, 23 percent in 2010, 28 percent in 2020, 33 percent in 
2030, and 40 percent in 2040. In contrast, the tax rate of the MAA in 1990 was 
already very high, 3 1 percent, and we do not expect it to increase much more. 
Its peak will come around 2101 at 35 percent, and it will remain at about 33 
percent for a long time. If the WAP and MAA are viewed as a combined sys- 
tem, something almost certain to become a reality in the near future, their tax 
rate was 14 percent in 1990, and we expect it to increase to 39 percent in 2040, 
following almost a straight line. 
1.4  Three Policies to Alleviate Future Burdens 
Given  current  public  pension  systems and demographic  factors,  we have 
shown that the pension tax burden on the working population in half a century 
will be almost three times higher than it is now. Furthermore, as the population 
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Fig. 1.10  Reduction in number of old-age pension recipients 
will be borne by the future working population. To strike a proper balance in 
the burdens between generations, we must find a way to alleviate the burden 
of future generations effectively without eroding the confidence of the elderly 
in the pension systems. In this section, we measure the impacts of three alterna- 
tive policies that could serve this purpose: (1) delay of the start of payments 
until age 65, (2) a form of indexation of pension benefits to the real disposable 
income of the working population, and (3) price indexation of pension benefits. 
1.4.1 
Number of recipients. Figure 1.10 shows the reduction in the number of pen- 
sion recipients if the start of WAP and MAA benefits is delayed until age 65. 
The transition is assumed to start in 1995, at the rate of one biological year for 
every five years, and it is assumed to be completed in the year 2015. In terms 
of actual computation, the proportion of baseline case recipients who will actu- 
ally receive benefits in the 60-64  age group is reduced by one-fifth every five 
years, until it reaches zero in 2015. Our results suggest that the total number 
of  old-age WAP recipients will be reduced by  about 2.5 million individuals 
once the transition is completed. This amounts to one-sixth of the baseline old- 
age benefit recipients. 
Delay of the Start of Pension Benefits 
Cost of  benejts. In terms of the total cost of benefits, the delay in the start of 
payments will save about 3 trillion yen for the WAP and about 0.5 trillion yen 
for the MAA. These savings are much smaller than the reduction in the number 
of old-age pension recipients might suggest because survivor benefits will be 
affected very little by the measure. 32  Seiritsu Ogura 
Required tax rate. In figure 1.11, we show how the required payroll tax rate 
will evolve if we move to delay the start of  pension payments. After 2015, this 
measure will reduce the required tax rate by 4-5  percent. 
1.4.2  Indexation to Disposable Income or Taxation of Benefits 
The most compelling reason to control the future cost of  pension benefits is 
that if we leave the current system as it is now, it is quite possible that the net 
disposable income of the future working population will be reduced to less 
than that of  the pension recipients. Considering this possibility, some argue 
that pension benefits should be indexed, not to wages, but to the disposable 
income of the working population, as in Germany (Takayama 1992). It is not 
easy to simulate this case, and know what this proposal will mean in terms of 
the required tax rate within the current framework, without modeling the entire 
public sector. Therefore, we consider an alternative scheme in which insurance 
taxes are collected from pension benefits. This alternative measure not only 
adequately captures the spirit of  disposable income indexation but also has 
considerable merit on its own. 
First of  all, under this scheme, if  an increase in the insurance tax reduces 
the disposable income of the working population, it will reduce the disposable 
income of retirees at exactly the same rate. Social insurance tax rates by them- 
selves will not affect the relative amounts of disposable income between gener- 
ations. 
Second, the consequence of this measure is very predictable. Suppose that 
under the present scheme the total cost of  the benefits program at time t is 
given by  B(t)  and its tax base is given by X(t). Under this measure, although 
the total cost of the benefits remains unchanged, the new tax base is the sum 
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if we  denote the ratio of  B(t)  to X(t)  as b(t),  the new  (net) required tax rate, 
~*(t),  will be given by 
~*(t)  = b(t)/[l + b(t)], 
which is very simple to calculate. However, the government will pay part of 
the benefits, say h(t)B(t),  where h(t)  is the ratio of the government’s subsidy to 
the total cost of the benefits. Thus, the cost charged to the unit tax base of the 
program is given by  [  1 -  h(t)]b(f),  and the required tax rate will be given by 
T*(t) = [l -  X(t)]b(t)/[l  + b(t)]. 
To simplify the matter further, we will assume that each program can “tax” the 
benefits only up to the sum actually charged to it, or [l -  h(t)]B(t).  Under 
these assumptions, the required tax rate will be given by 
’ 
T*(t) = [l -  h(t)]b(t)/[l + (1 -  h(t))b(t)], 
or simply 
T*(t) = T(t)/[l + T(t)], 
where ~(t)  is the required tax rate for the baseline case. 
The relationship between the new required tax rate ~*(t)  and the baseline 
tax rate ~(t)  is quite nonlinear; for example, if b(t)  is 30 percent, the new tax 
rate will be 23 percent, and if b(t)  is 40 percent, the new tax will still be only 
29 percent. Figure 1.11 shows the path of the new tax rate. From the figure, we 
can see that even if we continue to start paying the old-age pension at age 60, 
we will still be able to keep the required tax rate under 30 percent in the 2040s, 
when it is at its peak. Delaying the start of the old-age pension by  five years 
will shave off 2 percent more at the peak. 
1.4.3  Price Indexation 
In  the baseline case, we  have  seen that if  we try to index public pension 
benefits fully to wages, we must expect an unrealistically heavy burden on the 
future working population. The proposed delay of the start of old-age benefits 
by five years will help to reduce the burden, but only by  about 5 percent, which 
hardly makes a dent in the problem. This is precisely the reason we have inves- 
tigated the implication of disposable income indexation. In this section, as an 
alternative to disposable income indexation, we look at the effect of indexing 
benefits to the price level. 
Every five years, public pension systems take account of  changes in  the 
wage level, reevaluate the historical wages of  pension recipients, and recom- 
pute pension benefits. For the years in between, the benefits are indexed to the 
price level. In  the baseline case, we have  assumed that pension benefits are 
fully indexed to the wage index. This was the case until 1986, when the WAP 
law was revised. 
Since the last revision of  the WAP  law, however, historical wages are no 34  Seiritsu Ogura 
longer  given  an  across-the-board  full-wage indexation.  In  fact, the rates  at 
which historical  wages are reevaluated are decreasing functions of the time 
elapsed. That rate is 100 percent for the preceding five years and declines to 
around 70 percent for 30-plus years. Since this indexation is one of the most 
important parts of the public pension systems, it should not be left to the discre- 
tion of the government. 
If there is no growth in real wages, it makes no difference whether we index 
benefits to the wage level or the price level. In what follows, we assume some 
growth in real wages. No one knows, however, what the rate of growth in real 
wages will be in the next 50 years, and all we can do is assume a reasonable 
rate of growth. In fact, we will assume that real wages will grow 1 percent per 
year, which is modest enough to be within the reach of our economy and yet 
sizable enough to make a real difference in the proposed scheme. 
In figure  1.12, the curve at the top stands for standardized wages of  male 
workers of different ages in 1990 who belonged to HIMG. The horizontal axis 
represents age in decreasing order, and the vertical axis represents wages ex- 
pressed in terms of thousands of yen. We can interpret this curve as the reevalu- 
ated values of the historical wages a retiring worker will get at age 60 if he has 
worked in a small firm for most of his life and if his past wages are reevaluated 
by reflecting all the increases in wages until his retirement. 
The second curve from the top stands for the results of reevaluation using 
the price level instead of  the wage level. We  are assuming a difference of  1 
percent per year between the two indices. Because of the change in indexation, 
for a worker to whom the maximum 480 months are credited,  the lifetime 
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Fig. 1.13  Effects of price indexation on required tax rates (1 percent real wage 
growth assumed) 
the wage indexation case. If he has only the minimum 300 months’ credit, the 
lifetime average will be 95 percent of the baseline case. 
After retirement, the worker will receive only the price indexation, not the 
wage indexation. The five bottom curves reflect the relative values of his re- 
evaluated wages vis-8-vis  the working population  at subsequent  ages. As a 
result, for a worker who has 480 months’ credit, the lifetime average will be 
about 67 percent, or two-thirds, of the average in the full-wage indexation case. 
Required tax rate. Figure  1.13 shows the path of  the required  tax rate if  we 
start price indexation of all past earnings in  1995. It also shows the path for 
the case of benefit taxation combined with price indexation. For reference pur- 
poses, paths for the baseline case and for benefit taxation with wage indexation 
also are shown. By and large, price indexation alone has about the same effect 
as the taxation of benefits, and price indexation and taxation can keep the max- 
imum tax rate below 25 percent. 
1.5  Concluding Remarks 
The results of our simulation of the baseline case clearly illustrate the insta- 
bility of the Japanese public pension systems. The insurance tax rates of pen- 
sion programs for employees will climb in an almost straight-line fashion until 
they reach 40 percent in the middle of the next century. The generation born in 
the 30 years after 2020 will have to bear about twice the burden of the preced- 
ing generation. It is very hard to justify such rapid changes in the distribution 
of income between generations. Under a reasonable set of circumstances, it is 36  Seiritsu Ogura 
quite possible for the economic welfare of the future working population  to 
fall below that of the retired population. 
The most effective way to deal with this problem is to control the cost of 
future benefits. In the preceding analyses, we have investigated the effects of 
three possible measures: (1) delay of the start of old-age pensions, (2) index- 
ation of benefits to disposable income or taxation of  benefits, and (3) price 
indexation of benefits. We have seen that option 1 will reduce the required tax 
rate by 5 percent, option 2 by  10 percent, and option 3 by  10 percent, if they 
are implemented separately. Various combinations of these options will have 
greater effects but much less effect than the simple sum of all the options. 
The JCER-NBER joint Hakone Conference on Aging, where this paper was 
first presented, was held in September 1993. In spring 1994, the Japanese gov- 
ernment prepared  a comprehensive WAP reform package and sent it to the 
Diet. The package had three major components: (1) minimization of work dis- 
incentive by redesigning partial benefits, (2)  postponement of full benefits until 
age 65, and (3) formal adoption of disposable income indexation instead of 
wage indexation. With regard to the second point, under the government pro- 
posal, starting in 2013 those aged 60-64  who currently qualify for WAP spe- 
cial benefits would lose the equivalent of the basic pension. Retired employees 
and spouses would also have to wait until age 65 to receive basic pension bene- 
fits. With regard to the third point, the government formally proposed abandon- 
ing full indexing of past earnings to the current wage level, which it did de 
facto in 1990. The idea of disposable income indexation, however, invited an- 
other question: Whose disposable income should be chosen as the index? 
The reform bill passed, and the government was able to get what it wanted- 
disposable income indexation  and  a reduction  in  the  special benefit by  an 
amount equal to the basic pension. The government has also prepared its offi- 
cial  1994 projections of  public pension costs, but as the technical details of 
these projections are not made public,  we cannot compare them with ours. 
The government is, in any case, constrained by its own unrealistic population 
projections, which must account for some of  the difference with ours. The 
government’s projections are substantially more optimistic than ours. 
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